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"Theories and Evidence" is a fitting general title but it conceals the variety of
subjects covered in part I ofthis book. The purpose ofthis chapter is to intro-
duce these themes, point out the connections between them, and provide some
explanations and extensions. References and detail will be mostly left to chap-
ters 2-5, for which this is to serve as a guide.
1.1 Early and Recent Theories
Theories of business cycles should presumably help us to understand the
salient characteristics of the observed pervasive and persistent nonseasonal
fluctuations of the economy. The next chapter first presents a summary of
these "stylized facts." The discussion then proceeds from historical theories,
which were largely endogenous, deterministic, multicausal, and descriptive,
to contemporary theories, which are largely exogenous, stochastic, monocau-
sal or limited to very few types ofshocks, and based on small formal models.
The early authors emphasized the instability of investment in fixed capital
and inventories as well as of the supply of credit used for the acquisition of
real and financial assets. Changes in relative input and output prices, interest
rates, and profits constituted another important area of interest. Uncertainty
about the profitability of future business ventures and volatility of the asso-
ciated expectations received much attention even before Keynes elevated
these factors to particular importance. The investment accelerator was among
the earliest discoveries ofthe theories ofeconomic growth and instability.
The rise of mathematical analysis in the 1930s and 1940s was marked by a
dichotomy between the endogenous accelerator-multiplier models driven by
nonlinearities and lags and the exogenous models, often ofsimilar content but
driven by shocks. The shocks can be few and large or many and small, ran-
dom or serially correlated. The macroeconometric models, which first became
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prominent at about the same time, embraced the exogenous, stochastic ap-
proach, perhaps largely for reasons oftechnical convenience as nonlinearities
are difficult to handle on a large scale. This did not change with the develop-
ment ofever more sophisticated analytical and computational techniques and
ever larger econometric models. The latter came under heavy criticism re-
cently in the mainstream literature, which favors simple and stable but also
linear and stochastic models. However, there is no conclusive evidence that
nonlinearities are not very important or that identifiable random shocks do in
fact drive business cycles.
Money and prices received little or no attention in the accelerator-multiplier
interaction and other Keynesian disequilibrium models. In contrast, shocks to
the stock ofmoney, notably those due to shifts and errors in monetary policy,
represent the principal source ofinstability in the monetarist theory. Monetary
change has real effects, except in the long run where it influences prices only
as in the classical Walrasian prototype theory. Any trade-off with unemploy-
ment can exist only for unanticipated changes in the price level; in equilibrium
with fully anticipated inflation, the "expectations-augmented" Phillips curve
is approximately vertical.
In the Keynesian literature of the 1960s and 1970s the role of money and
monetary policy in business cycles was increasingly recognized, but other
influences retained their importance as well, notably the variability of private
investlnent and shifts in fiscal policy. The natural-rate hypothesis has been
generally accepted, too, but the shifts in the Phillips curve due to changes in
inflationary expectations are mostly viewed as slow. A common feature of
these theories is that they are concerned mainly with changes in aggregate
demand that are translated into fluctuations in output and employment because
wages and prices are considerably less than fully flexible over the relevant
time horizons. This view ofthe world has long prevailed in the work on busi-
ness cycles, which thus sharply departed from the competitive market-
clearing paradigm that dominated the theory ofprice and long-term growth.
It has only been in the last two decades that this contradiction has led to an
important new-classical resurgence and new-Keynesian response in macro-
economics. Two strong motivations stirred up this ferment in the recent liter-
ature. The first is to build dynamic models consistent with what are viewed as
the basic empirical characteristics ofbusiness cycles. The second is to ensure
that these models have the desired microeconomic foundations, that is, that
they are consistent with utility- and profit-maximizing behavior ofindividuals
and firms. The task of achieving both of these objectives simultaneously is
very ambitious, far from accomplishment, and indeed ofuncertain feasibility.
One reason for this is the complex and changing nature ofbusiness cycles, as
discussed briefly below (and in more detail in chapters 2 and 3). Otherreasons
lie in problems oftheory introduced in sections 1.4-1.6 below and examined
more thoroughly in chapters 2 and 4.3 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
1.2 The Diversity and Evolution ofBusiness Cycles
The National Bureau of Economic Research, in its comprehensive studies
of long time series for the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, doc-
umented the timing and amplitudes of recurrent nonseasonal fluctuations in
numerous indexes and aggregates covering a variety of economic processes.
Based on the strong elements ofconsensus in these movements, chronologies
ofpeaks and troughs in macroeconomic activity were constructed for the four
countries (see chapter 5 for a brief survey of this research). There is much
evidence of the pervasiveness and persistence of business cycles. However,
although individual cycles share important family characteristics, they are by
no means all alike. The historical experience includes some violent swings of
boom and bust, some extended depressions, and (especially in recent times)
some long periods ofrelative tranquillity.
In short, the record shows much diversity of the so measured business
cycles. Although most contractions were short and mild, some were long and/
or severe. Although most expansions were neither very long nor very vigor-
ous, some had one or both ofthese attributes.
The long and widely held view that the U.S. economy tended to be less
unstable after World War II than before has recently been challenged. A re-
view of data and literature in chapter 3 upholds the earlier view, with some
modifications. In particular, business contractions became somewhat shorter,
and much milder and less frequent, whereas both real growth and inflation
grew much more persistent. When the possible sources of the moderation of
business cycles are considered, they are found to form a rather long list. Sev-
eral ofthe examined hypotheses are affirmed, and the selection has some im-
plications for the general analysis ofbusiness cycles.
The following factors have probably contributed significantly to the in-
creased stability ofthe economy:
1. Shifts in employment to less cyclical, largely service-producing indus-
tries. This is consistent with the net destabilizing role of changes in busi-
ness inventories and durable-goods purchases.
2. Increased size ofthe acyclical government sector.
3. Increased role of automatic (mainly fiscal) stabilizers. Points 2 and 3 are
consonant with the idea that growth in normal government activities can,
up to a point and given certain rules, offset some of the instability of
aggregate private demand.
4. Reduced frequency and intensity of financial crises. Here the implication
is simply that such crises can aggravate (if not necessarily cause) business
cycles.
5. Some favorable fiscal (mainly tax) policies.
6. Reduced volatility of monetary growth (to the extent that money plays an
independent role rather than merely adjusting to changes in income or4 Chapter One
business activity). Points 5 and 6 imply that fiscal and monetary policy
actions can add to or reduce macroeconomic instability.
7. Greater confidence of private economic agents, both induced by the ob-
served business cycle moderation itself and inducing behavior favorable
to more stable economic growth. This suggests a role for endogenous and
self-validating expectations in reinforcing positive (or negative) macro-
economic trends.
1.3 Some Implications and Evidence: Problems with Monocausal
Explanations
What theories can do justice to such diverse and evolving phenomena? It is
doubtful that monocausal hypotheses can, whether the single factor to which
they attribute business cycles be real, monetary, or expectational. Theories
that rely on a simple interaction (such as that ofthe accelerator-multiplier) or
a single type of shock (e.g., to the money supply, investment demand, or
technology) are attractively simple and can be instructive. But they fare on
the whole poorly when confronted with data, presumably because they are
seriously incomplete.
Models that rely on cumulative propagation effects of small and frequent
white-noise shocks from a single source produce fluctuations with common
properties that may be fairly regular. They cannot account for any systematic
variation or historical evolution ofbusiness cycles.
Although a model should be as simple as possible, the wider the range of
the relevant facts it covers, the greater is its claim to validity. There is no way
to discriminate effectively between the many models that address "the" busi-
ness cycle on the sole basis ofthis or that ofits selected aspects; one must ask
ofthe models that they be reasonably consistent with all or most ofthe impor-
tant stylized facts supplied by history.
Empirically implemented stochastic models suggest that the U.S. economy
is exposed to a mixture of shocks, mostly small but occasionally large, with
no one source being dominant. Small "structural" models using vector auto-
regressions (VAR) have aggregate demand disturbances accounting for the
largest proportion of the variance of total output; aggregate supply, fiscal,
money, and credit shocks exert smaller effects. As the forecast or simulation
horizon grows longer, the relative importance of demand shocks tends to de-
cline, that ofsupply shocks tends to rise. I
1. In the model of Blanchard and Watson 1986 (quarterly, 1947-82), demand shocks contrib-
uted 54% to the variance of the log of real GNP four quarters ahead; shocks to supply, fiscal
operations, and the stock of money contributed 15%-16% each. One quarter ahead, the role of
aggregate demand was much larger yet (74%); the fiscal and monetary influences were much
smaller (3%-4%). For a model with bank loans and M1, Bernanke (1986) reports somewhat
larger demand effects four quarters out and smaller supply effects; money and credit account for
11%-12% ofGNP variance each.5 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
Different and larger macroeconometric models detect different and more
types of shock, which here affect the stochastic equations and the variables
treated as exogenous. But the reported simulation results, when properly ag-
gregated, are similar in that they assign the largest effects to demand shocks
(mainly to durables consumption, housing, and business fixed and inventory
investment). Fiscal, supply, and monetary shocks taken together explain sta-
tistically about 30%-40% of the variance ofoutput (Fair 1988; also see Eck-
stein and Sinai 1986).
The numerical results of any such decomposition are questionable because
of differential limitations of the applied econometric and VAR methods, the
likely specification errors and identification problems, the reliance on linear
relations with constant parameters, and the restriction to short time series cov-
ering only the moderate postwar fluctuations. Different models may well be
required in application to different conditions, for example, the interwar
depressions. But the consensus of a wide range of recent models on at least
one point is telling: the theory of business cycles must recognize more than
one critical factor and come to grips with the interaction of shifts in demand
and supply, real and nominal variables, and changes originating in private
behavior and government actions.
1.4 New Developments
Three trends are manifest in the contemporary literature: (1) the increased
emphasis on the role of aggregate supply, its determinants and effects; (2) the
new insistence on maintaining the assumption ofcompetitive markets cleared
by relative price changes; and (3) the adoption of the hypothesis of rational
expectations (RE). All ofthese converged in the family ofnew-classical equi-
librium theories ofthe business cycle.
The first generation ofthese models relied on imperfect information: prices
outside one's own market are known only with a lag. Random monetary
shocks induce changes in the price level that are temporarily mistaken for
changes in relative prices, which gives rise to wrong production and invest-
ment decisions. The second generation, currently favored by equilibrium
theorists, is the theory ofreal business cycle (RBC), which can be viewed as
a stochastic version of the Walrasian prototype. It assumes full information,
replaces perfect foresight by RE, and links fluctuations in output and employ-
ment to real disturbances only, not nominal disturbances misperceived as real
ones.
The existing RBC models use shocks to technology and hence to the repre-
sentative worker's productivity (other conceivable real shocks are to prefer-
ences, weather, government expenditures, and tax rules). Favorable impulses
of this type raise the current return relative to the expected future return and
so stimulate the present productive effort at the expense of the future effort;
negative impulses have the opposite effect of inducing workers to substitute6 Chapter One
more leisure now for less later. A high degree of intertemporal substitution of
labor is assumed in both the imperfect-information and the RBC equilibrium
theories. Productivity of capital varies with that of labor, so positive shocks
cause investment to rise. A long gestation lag spreads the effects ofinvestment
on output over the time needed to build the finished capital goods.
Although lacking clear support from the data, the hypothesis of RE was
widely adopted as a maintained premise, with important implications for the
analytical methods used. The hypothesis ofprice flexibility was not, but many
ofthose economists who continued to treat wages and prices as "sticky" now
embarked on a search for a reconciliation of this assumption with economic
theory. The resulting work on the "microeconomic foundations" ofmacroeco-
nomics gave particular impetus to studies ofaspects ofaggregate supply.
A sharp distinction has been drawn in some recent writings between new-
classical (NC) and new-Keynesian (NK) macroeconomics (see especially
R. 1. Gordon 1990). The assumption that prices continuously clear the mar-
kets is common to both generations ofNC but is not accepted by NK. The NK
literature uses imperfections ofcompetition, information, and capital markets
in attempts to explain why prices and wages are to a large extent set and sticky.
This is to provide the microtheoretic foundation for why a decline in nominal
demand should be associated with a fall in aggregate output (recession) rather
than a proportional downward adjustment in the price level. The new theories
of cost and price rigidities are discussed in chapter 4 from the viewpoint of
their contributions to our understanding ofbusiness cycles.
1.5 The New-Classical Single-Shock Models
Since monetary and price data increased greatly in availability, quality, and
promptness, the theory of recurrent price misperceptions resulting from un-
anticipated monetary disturbances should be less applicable now than in ear-
lier times. Indeed, the main recognized defect ofthis theory is the implausi-
bility of its informational assumptions. At the present, aggregate data on
nominal variables are not so much stale as of uncertain dependability and
subject to revisions over time. Moreover, output does not appear to be inde-
pendent of that component of monetary growth which could have been ob-
served or anticipated (and which should have been therefore met exclusively
by price adjustments).
The hypothesis that has people confuse absolute with relative price changes
also requires prices to be flexible in the short run. It is impaired by the evi-
dence that the responsiveness of the price level to fluctuations in monetary
growth and income has diminished. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, indus-
trial prices used to decline in cyclical slowdowns and contractions, but they
no longer do so in the postwar era ofcontinuing inflation.
Prices are flexible also in the RBC theory, now the more active class of
equilibrium models. Here inside money and credit provide inputs into the pro-7 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
duction process in the form of transactions and financial services; they are
driven by the economic activity and this explains their positive correlation
with output. In reality, passive responses of money and credit are common,
though they take different forms under different monetary regimes (chapter 3).
But this is not the whole story: on occasions active money changes occur that
are ofparamount importance. Thus, monetary authorities can take actions that
result in curtailment of monetary growth or even the stock of money. Under
other conditions, banks may restrain the availability and raise the real cost of
credit.
The aggregate RBC model postulates overall productivity shifts that have
strong effects on the total demand for labor. This requires that the diffusion of
the shocks to technology across the economy be wide and prompt, but actu-
ally technical changes are likely to be localized and gradual. Thus, most of
the interest in the dynamics of Schumpeterian innovations-new products,
new technologies, new markets-centers on their role in "long waves," not
business cycles (cf. van Duijn 1983, ch. 6; Tichy 1983, esp. pp. 80-81). For
five major innovations in the United States, 1953-74, the estimated average
half-life of the diffusion process was about eight years (Mansfield 1980, pp.
578-80).
The shocks to productivity must be sufficiently large in either direction to
result in general business expansions and contractions in the absence of mul-
tiplier effects. (The RBC model makes no distinction between the actual and
the potential output and so has no multipliers.) It is difficult to think of what
would cause such recurrent disturbances and particularly of a technical re-
gress that could account for a major depression. The only supply shocks with
demonstrably large power that have been identified so far are the oil cartel's
explosive price increases in the middle and late 1970s, which were associated
with unique inflationary recessions. These are important cases that the RBC
model can help explain but no other similar examples come to mind. Histori-
cally, the predominant relationship between the cyclical movements in output
and the price level (or its deviations from long trends) was positive, not in-
verse.
1.6 Technical Change, Productivity, and Investment
The rate of neutral technical change has been estimated residually from an
aggregate production function under the assumptions of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale (Solow 1957). Updating such calculations con-
firms that the "Solow residual," an indirect measure of the rate of change in
total factor productivity, is positively correlated with the rate of growth in
output (see, e.g., Mankiw 1989, p. 84). When interpreted as a proxy for ex-
ogenous shifts in the technology ofproduction, these estimates show that such
shocks fall to negative values (technical regress) in the years ofrecessions and
rise and are positive in the years of business recoveries and expansions.8 Chapter One
Whether the shocks derived from this model are viewed as highly persistent
(Prescott 1986, pp. 25-27) or as random (Plosser 1989, p. 63), this reading
supports the RBC theory.
It is very unlikely, however, that any nationwide technological decline oc-
curred in the recessions of 1949, 1954, 1958, 1960, 1979, or 1980-82 with-
out anyone having noted it at the time (the OPEC shocks in 1974 and 1979, of
course, aroused great public concern). It is far more plausible that the produc-
tivities of both labor and capital fall in business slowdowns and contractions
because workers and machines have less work to do as demand declines.
Skilled and specialized labor is "hoarded" since dismissing and reacquiring it
is costly, and speedy capacity adjustments are costly as well. It is important to
make investment in human capital pay and difficult to predict the occurrence
and duration of demand fluctuations; hence uncertainty impedes the proper
timing ofinput changes.
Laborhoarding can be added to a model ofRBC with indivisible labor (i.e.,
a fixed shift length in hours, as in Hansen 1985) by making firms vary the
effort required from their workers in response to exogenous shocks. The work
effort is then procyclical and positively correlated with the Solow residual and
government consumption or military expenditures used as proxy for demand
shocks. In this model, which has perfectly competitive and complete markets,
the ability oftechnology shocks to account for fluctuations in aggregate output
is drastically reduced (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1990). The model
shows some improvement on the standard RBC analysis in that it approxi-
mates better the observed leading cyclical behaviorofthe average productivity
of labor (which is here positively correlated with future, and negatively cor-
related with lagged, total hours worked).
Still another interpretation ofthe procyclical movement ofthe Solow resid-
ual is that it reflects market power and excess capacity (Hall 1986). The
markup ratio of price over marginal cost (PIMC) exceeds 1 (its value under
competition) and firms often operate in the region of decreasing average cost
or increasing returns. This would impart a procyclical bias to the residual
estimate even ifthe true factor productivity were constant (neither influenced
by nor causing business cycles). This approach represents the opposite ex-
treme to the aggregate RBC model; it also conflicts with the alternative expla-
nation of procyclical productivity based on labor hoarding, constant returns,
and sticky prices (Rotemberg and Summers 1988).2
"Autonomous" investment in fixed capital driven by innovations that re-
quire more capital per worker has long been recognized as an important force
2. Finally, one should mention a strong statistical argument against the reliability ofthe method
ofresidual estimation oftotal factor productivity with the available data. In this approach, techni-
cal change accounts for more than 50% of real GNP growth in the United States between 1909
and 1949. Alternative calculations suggest that this makes "technical change" a catchall for omit-
ted factors and measurement errors, much of it a "measure of our ignorance" (Denison 1974,
1980; Jorgenson, Griliches, and Denison 1972).9 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
in both economic development and business cycles (e.g., in such diverse theo-
ries as those of Schumpeter and Hansen). In Keynesian models the autono-
mous investment is volatile, and its unpredicted shifts have important multi-
plier effects on consumption and income. But the desired stock of capital
increases with output (more strictly, the expected demand for output), so in-
vestment is also in part induced by real growth through a "flexible accelerator"
relation. Accelerator-multiplier interaction processes play a central role in
various dynamic models. Depending on the parameters involved, they can
give rise to explosive, maintained, or damped fluctuations, that is, either to
endogenous nonlinear theories or to exogenous stochastic theories ofbusiness
cycles.
The NC equilibrium models have no multiplier mechanisms, and compen-
satory combinations oflarge shocks to technology and a strong instantaneous
accelerator lack credibility. The models also fail to produce the sizable posi-
tive autocorrelation ofinvestment that is observed.
1.7 Cyclical Movements in Prices, Cost, and Profits
Indexes of U.S. wholesale (and to a lesser extent consumer) prices tended
to fluctuate procyclically around alternating upward and downward trends be-
tween 1789 and 1932 (Zarnowitz and Moore 1986, pp. 525-31). These move-
ments canceled each other to a large extent over the long stretch covered by
historical statistics, even when the inflationary war periods are included. The
last half-century, however, witnessed the longest, largest, and most continu-
ous inflation on record. The recent recessions and major slowdowns were no
longer associated with any general deflation, only and at most with some dis-
inflation. (Indeed, inflation accelerated during the contractions in 1974 and
1980, in part as a result ofthe novel supply shocks-the huge increases in oil
prices imposed by the OPEC cartel.) The variability of quarterly log differ-
ences in prices was much smaller after World War II than in the earlier
periods.
A review ofthe evidence suggests that in recent times money wages as well
as prices have become less sensitive to retardations and declines in aggregate
demand, even while the cyclical instability of the economy has decreased
(chapter 4). This seems inconsistent with the principle ofthe market-clearing
role ofprices but it really is not. Depending on the underlying conditions and
sources of the shifts in the economy, departures from price flexibility mayor
may not be destabilizing. The main contrast is between the stabilizing poten-
tial of flexible relative prices and the destabilizing potential of large move-
ments in the general price level.
Major deflations of the past had strong adverse expectational and distribu-
tional effects, and their nonoccurrence after the Great Contraction of 1929-33
was salutary. But the long persistent inflation ofthe postwar era could not stay
moderate or unanticipated and became itself a major source of instability. It10 Chapter One
accelerated in the 1970s, grew increasingly volatile, and gave rise to varying
inflationary expectations, much uncertainty, and popular discontent. It led to
oscillating, tardy, and excessive policy interventions that had disturbing con-
sequences oftheir own.
The effects on the economy ofchanges in expected inflation depend on the
adjustments of nominal interest rates. The latter have become prompter and
stronger in the last two decades than they had been before. They can be stabi-
lizing, up to a point, ifpermitted by the monetary authorities.
Relative price adjustments work best when the general price level is reason-
ably stable. Moderate fluctuations in the price level or the rate ofinflation are
not necessarily detrimental to real growth. In contrast, protracted and antici-
pated declines in wages and prices have aggravated demand contractions and
accompanied the worst depressions in the history of U.S. business cycles.
Long and rapid inflations can also be associated with very depressed eco-
nomic conditions, as illustrated by recent developments in several Latin
American countries. (The United States has avoided such inflations in peace-
time.)
The structural changes that have contributed to the relative stabilization of
the economy in recent times are probably also responsible in part for the re-
duction in the cyclicality of wages and prices. Not only quantities but prices
as well tend to be cyclically less sensitive for services than for goods. Hence,
the large rise in the overall weight of services should have made the compre-
hensive cost and price indexes more sticky.
Another factor working in the same direction was the spread of long and
staggered wage contracts prompted by the growth of labor unions (which
peaked in the first halfofthe postwar period). More generally, technical prog-
ress and competition require large investments in human capital that payoff
best when employment relations are long term, maintaining stably rising lev-
els of productivity and real compensation. Implicit contracts designed to pro-
duce such conditions would favor, and might be inferred from, the observed
growth ofcareeremployment in the corporate sector, professions, and govern-
ment.
A rise in confidence and the perceived probability that business contrac-
tions and slowdowns will remain brief and mild would help to keep up spend-
ing and hence firm up prices in general. So expectations of prosperity may
also counteract price declines or cuts.
Procyclical movements in delivery lags help absorb changes in demand.
The frequency of price changes is reduced by nonprice market clearing. An
increase in the role ofproduction to order and adjustments in delivery periods
would have made the measured price level more sticky.
Prices offinished industrial products generally move less than average pro-
duction costs, which tend to rise relative to their trends in slowdowns and
downswings and decline late in recessions and particularly in early and high
expansions. (These lagging cost changes reflect mainly the sensitive behavior11 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
oflabor productivity-outputper hour-and the sluggish behavior ofwages.)
As a result, the markups on unit labor costs and profit margins have strong
cyclical movements that typically lead at peaks and troughs by long intervals,
responding directly to changes in productivity and inversely to changes in
cost. Total profits have similar large fluctuations with somewhat shorter leads.
These patterns of relative movements in prices and costs, productivity and
profitability, are well documented in recent data, but they may have a long
history and do not imply that prices in general are necessarily very sticky.
Certain NK hypotheses on why wages and prices are rigid assume monop-
olistic competition or oligopoly. Labor productivity is taken to be a rising
function of real or relative wages, which are therefore kept high ("efficiency
wages"). Small deviations from the equilibrium price affect profits only
slightly and are therefore not worth correcting, as the individual firm sees it
("menu cost"). These are interesting ideas but their applicability is still to be
established. They would gain support from the data if it could be shown that
market power has increased in recent times, but it is not clear that it has.
1.8 Elements ofBusiness Cycle Dynamics: Some Illustrations
Lags and nonlinearities provide the essential ingredients of endogenous
business cycle models, which are valued for not being dependent on the theo-
retically unexplained and empirically unobserved outside shocks. There is a
strong presumption that these elements are indeed important in the immanent
dynamics of the economy. Some simple examples are presented in figure 1. 1
and the text below; they draw on theories discussed in more detail in the chap-
ters that follow. But it should be noted at the outset that the available formal
and fully articulated models ofself-sustaining cycles are generally small, ab-
stract, and of uncertain value in interpreting the world. The main probable
reason lies in the limitations imposed by the mathematical complexity ofcon-
structing larger models of this type. In any event, what we have is a number
of ingenious but fragmentary constructs and a larger number of interesting
ideas that may serve as building blocks for a more general theory. My purpose
here is merely to introduce some such notions that seem to fit the facts at least
some ofthe time.
One old idea is that near, at, and above full employment the demand for
labor and materials tends to outrun supplies, driving up wages and other input
costs. At the same time, growth of capital and output may deter comparably
large rises in prices of final goods and services. At low employment and ca-
pacity utilization, however, prices rise faster than wages and other costs. In
other words, the rate of change in costs (c) leads the rate of change in prices
(p), as shown by the upper pair ofcurves in figure 1.1. When the increase in
p exceeds the increase in c, profits per unit of sales rise; when the reverse
obtains, they fall (see curve IllS).
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Fig. 1.1 Selected nonlinear relationships used in business cycle models
stable during the intervening periods of moderate growth. The long-term av-
erage rate of inflation is assumed to be low (perhaps close to 0) and highly
stable. History offers examples of a prevalence of such conditions of long-
period monetary and price stability in peacetime, notably during the pre-
World War I gold standard era (which presumably explains the good overall
fit of the original Phillips curve). But in an age of secular inflation, the ex-
pected rates of price and wage changes will not indefinitely lag behind the
actual rates, unless the latter continually accelerate. Hence, the simple Phil-
lips relationship between inflation and unemployment (or the ratio ofactual to
natural output, QIQ*) will be destabilized as it was in the late 1960s and13 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
1970s. In such times, then, the c and p curves would steepen (i.e., tilt coun-
terclockwise) and shift upward with anticipations of rising inflation, as indi-
cated by arrows in figure 1.1). 3 It seems plausible that the hypothesized cycli-
cal effects on, and differential behavior of, the relative prices (c. vs. p) could
well persist as long as the inflation remained moderate, but one can certainly
think ofdisabling conditions in this context as well (e.g., rapid inflation with
c lagging behind p,. the two curves tending to common verticality).
In various theories of the business cycle, demand rises less than output as
the expansion unfolds; that is, final sales flatten or "lag," as shown by the S
curve in the chart. One possible source is the short-run consumption function,
whose slope is positive but less than 1 and perhaps getting gradually smaller.
The accelerator effects on fixed investment and inventory investment of the
declining growth in consumption must also be considered. The growth in out-
put itself is thought of as decelerating as full employment is approached and
bottlenecks are increasingly encountered. Meanwhile, the accumulation ofthe
real capital stock (K) is picking up steam at high levels ofcapacity utilization,
which according to the flexible accelerator hypothesis has a negative effect on
net investment in business plant and equipment.
Given the TI/S and S function, the total profits curve (TI/S) x S will have an
inverted-U shape, like TI/S but lagging and steeper on the downgrade (see fig.
1.1). Since K is a slow-moving stock variable dominated by an upward trend,
the profit rate TIIK would reflect mainly the leading cyclical pattern ofTI, with
an even sharper decline. Expected profits should be influenced by past and
present realized profits and have a similar profile ofcyclical movement. This
supposition is indeed generally consistent with the observed tendencies of
both corporate profits and stock price indexes to lead at business cycle turns,
particularly peaks.
The decline in profit expectations is likely to dampen the rate ofreal invest-
ment demand, 11K, where I represents investment plans and commitments (ap-
propriations, contracts, and orders) rather than the lagging realizations (out-
lays and completions ofcapital projects). The sigmoid function (11K)o in figure
1.1 assumes that I responds positively to Q, given K, in the midrange ofper-
ceived positive profit opportunities. When expected profits are poor, dlldQ is
low or0, however, and this is the case at both very low and very high capacity
utilization levels. Given Q, net investment should depend inversely on K, but
gross investment need not, since depreciation and replacement investment are
positively related to the volume of the capital stock. A sufficiently large ex-
pansion ofK can nevertheless depress the total investment rate temporarily as
a result of"overbuilding."
Investment is clearly an inverse function of the level of interest rates (i) to
the extent that higher i represents in real terms both higher financing costs and
3. The alternative curves are not shown to avoid cluttering figure 1.1, which tries to reduce
complex dynamic situations to their simplest common elements.14 Chapter One
higher returns on nominal assets. This relationship too may be nonlinear, as
in the case when I is more interest sensitive at high than at low levels of i. In
the course of a business expansion, i will often start rising because of any or
all ofthe following: (1) the demand for credit outruns the supply ofcredit, (2)
the real rate of return on physical capital rises, and (3) expectations of infla-
tion increase (note that this last effect relates directly to the nominal, rather
than real, interest rates and can occur during business contractions as well).
In figure 1.1, this type of behavior is illustrated by the curve io. But other
developments are just as possible, since interest rates depend not only on the
demand for credit and its determinants, notably Q as the measure ofaggregate
economic activity, but also on the supply of credit and its determinants, no-
tably the role of banking and monetary policy. For example, increasing the
money supply growth rate at low levels ofQIQ* and reducing it at high levels
may produce such curves as i) and, in response, (IIK)). The opposite combi-
nation of a relatively restrictive (stimulative) policy when QIQ* is low (high)
can be represented by curves i 2 and (11K) 2.
Movements to the right along the hypothesized curves occur in recoveries
and expansions; movements to the left occur in slowdowns and recessions, as
indicated by the arrows at the top of figure 1. 1. But no simple schematic
representation can do justice to business cycle dynamics that include elements
of trends, irreversibilities, and shifts over time in some of the depicted func-
tions. As already noted, inflationary trends and expectations tend to shift the
c, p, and i curves. Also, long-term real growth will gradually pull upward the
aggregate sales and profits (S, TI) curves at any QIQ* ratio. The direction of
these effects is shown by arrows on the figure.
1.9 Extensions and Qualifications
Business cycles are diversified largely because they are propelled by a num-
ber of endogenous forces whose relative intensity varies over time. A major
source ofdifferences between the historical explanations ofbusiness cycles is
that one author places the main stress on factor A, another on B, etc. But the
selective emphasis is excessive, and the interaction of A and B may not be
given due attention. As is well known, the same observed relationship is fre-
quently predicted by several quite different theories. (Another reason for the
diversity ofboth business cycles and their explanations is that various outside
shocks impinge on the system.) Consider the following examples:
1. One of the theories which predict that costs typically rise faster than
prices in expansion combines the accelerator principle and differential supply
elasticities. The rise offinal demand at high levels ofcapacity utilization stim-
ulates investment in new productive facilities. This drives up further the de-
mand for labor, raw materials, and other producer goods at the very time their
supplies are becoming more scarce and less elastic. The unit labor costs in-
crease sharply as the availability of skilled workers is reduced and higher15 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
wages must be paid but growth of average productivity (output per hour)
slackens. It takes more time to plan and build capital goods-producers' du-
rable equipment and plant. Many materials are ofagricultural origin and have
long and rather rigid production periods (e.g., industrial crops, cattle hides). 4
The supply of standardized finished products can be expanded much more
readily.
2. Nonmonetary overinvestment theory argues that the rise in consumer
demand causes larger percentage rises in the demands for plant and equipment
and, a fortiori, materials processed by industry. Hence, again, c increases
relative to p. Investment, financed by the initially easy bank credit, is overex-
tended relative to consumer saving, and must eventually be curtailed as profits
fall, banks retrench, and interest rates rise. Thus early analysts ofthe business
cycle as different in their outlook and procedure as Mitchell and Hayek (see
2.3.1 and 2.3.6) had similar views on the role of the price-cost-profit move-
ment. 5
3. Thatp is reduced relative to c in contraction is due mainly to wages being
more resistant than prices offinished products to downward recessionary pres-
sures. Prices of crude materials tend to soften more than prices of finished
goods and services during general business slowdowns and recessions. The
strongly procyclical and leading behavior ofthe profit margin IllS is implied
by the assumed behavior ofp and c, and well documented in the data, and so
is the downturn oftotal profits later in expansion, which results not only from
the decrease in IllS but also from the reduced growth of S. The "profit
squeeze" is therefore as much a demand as a supply phenomenon. It too fea-
tures in various business cycle theories emphasizing changes in cost, over-
investment, and other maladjustments, but most notably in the early work of
Mitchell (see Haberler [1937] 1964, ch. 4).
4. The deceleration of final demand in the latter stages of expansion has
been given explanations varying from full-employment ceiling and accelera-
tor effects to cyclical changes in functional income distribution and consump-
tion. The share of labor in national income has a mildly countercyclical pat-
tern because real hourly wages increase somewhat less than output per hour
(labor productivity) in expansion, whereas the opposite prevails in contrac-
tion. The proportion ofconsumption is larger in labor income than in property
income, which is consistent with the finding that the ratio of total consump-
4. It should be noted that a large proportion of raw materials is imported, which at times can
strongly influence their relative prices. Thus, a change in the terms oftrade against materials and
in favor of finished products occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, tending to reduce the rise in c
vs. p.
5. Still other early business cycle theorists with widely varying views agreed on the strong
procyclical fluctuation of the relative price of capital goods, including Marx and Kalecki, as
shown in Sherman 1991, esp. chs. 10 and 11. This new monograph offers a very accessible
treatment of many theories, particularly the endogenous historical ones, plus interesting illustra-
tions ofthe average behavior ofmany time series during the post-World War II business cycles in
the United States.16 Chapter One
tion to national income (the average propensity to consume) is also mildly
countercyclical (Sherman 1991, chs. 5 and 8). Theories ofunderconsumption
span a long era from some early classics and social reformers (Lauderdale,
Malthus, Sismondi, Rodbertus) to Hobson 1922, Neisser 1934, A. H. Han-
sen 1939, and others. Keynes's idea that in an ex ante sense saving outruns
investment at full employment has an underconsumptionist flavor. 6 But, un-
like investment in producer and consumer durable goods, consumption prop-
erly defined is not very sensitive cyclically. Except perhaps in some past epi-
sodes of deflation and stagnation, examples of a systematic tendency for
underconsumption seem hard to find. 7
5. Errors of expectations play a critical role in several otherwise quite dif-
ferent theories. Thus, Lavington, Pigou, and Keynes all see a spread ofover-
optimism in expansion and disappointment and overpessimism in contraction.
Business people form their expectations adaptively by learning gradually from
the past, but they also share in pervasive moods and opinions, seeking safety
in numbers, especially in times of high uncertainty. The assumption made in
figure 1.1 is very simply that the prevailing expectations of sales and profits
(S*, (illS)*, and 11*) are lagged versions of the corresponding actual values
(S, illS, and 11). At high levels of economic activity, as measured by QIQ*,
expectations exceed realizations; at low levels, the reverse is the case (com-
pare the paired solid and broken curves). An overcorrection oferrors ofopti-
mism generates errors of pessimism. This depresses business confidence and
the demand for investment 11K, contributing to the economy's downturn. Sim-
ilarly, the shift from pessimistic to optimistic forecasts would raise confidence
and investment, aiding the recovery.
6. To make the model ofexpectations less crude and more convincing, one
would have to show what causes many agents to commit similar errors simul-
taneously, and why such errors are not avoided or at least not discovered and
corrected more promptly. This leads to a study of how competition works
under conditions ofuncertainty, that is, deficient knowledge, fragmentary and
partly wrong information, and very limited foresight. Economists have only
begun to explore this difficult subject (see 2.4.5). Empirical studies show that
economic forecasts tend to have much in common with extrapolations from
the recent past and so make large errors around turning points.8 The above
6. Note the long quotation from and sympathetic references to Hobson and Mummery 1889 in
Keynes 1936,ch. 23.
7. According to Haberler, "The under-consumption theory is a theory ofthe crisis and depres-
sion rather than a theory of the cycle" ([1937] 1964, ch. 5, pp. 119ff.). Sherman argues against
this view, though recognizing the serious incompleteness ofthe theory (1991 , ch. 9). He presents
an "underconsumptionist cycle model," which reduces to a second-order difference equation in
the national income, but that model treats as constant several parameters that are unlikely to be so
(the same applies to his models for some other endogenous theories that are probably essentially
nonlinear).
8. For evidence, see part IV; also, Lovell 1986. This argues against the hypothesis that expec-
tations are based immediately on the correct model ofhow the economy works. Insisting on super-
rationality in this sense often seems equivalent to the fallacy ofpetitio principii. But this is not to17 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
error model, though primitive, still has some useful implications. Investment
in new plant and equipment is often associated with investment in new prod-
ucts, markets, and technologies; as such, it typically requires a considerable
degree of confidence in the future. Confidence is an intangible but important
and clearly procyclical factor. Its influence on business capital investment can
be very strong at times, especially near and after cyclical turning points.
7. Expected sales are presumably the major determinant ofbusiness inven-
tories. Iftotal inventory depends on Se as assumed in figure 1.1, then it should
be increasingly perceived as too large relative to S in late expansion when Se
rises above S. By the same token, inventory should be increasingly perceived
as too small relative to S in contraction when Se falls below S. The data indi-
cate that total stocks ofgoods held in manufacturing and trade tend to increase
less than sales in recoveries (when S typically grows fast) and more than sales
in late stages ofexpansion and in contraction (when growth ofS declines and
becomes negative). The inventory-sales ratio is mainly countercyclical and
lagging; inventory investment is procyclical and leading, but very volatile
and irregular. These patterns reflect a mixture of intended and unintended in-
vestment.
1.10 Approaches to Diversity
Because business cycles are not all alike and are subject to historical
changes along with the structure and institutions of the economy, it is not
surprising that the numerous efforts to model them as a uniform by-product of
one type ofrandom shock or another have failed. Endogenous nonlinear mod-
els can capture important aspects ofthe economy's motion, but they are very
underdeveloped at present and far from the stage of empirical usefulness.
Whether they can reach that stage without the aid ofvarious shocks is uncer-
tain.
It is difficult but necessary to explain not only why business cycles occur
but also why they are diverse and changing. One possible approach is to look
for identifiable major events that might have "caused" the fluctuations with
the observed differential features. This view is widely adopted in popular dis-
cussions of current developments, where market reactions to economic and
political, domestic and foreign news receive much continuing attention. There
is certainly a great deal to be learned from keen observation ofthe contempo-
rary scene aided by good economics and intuition. But the large-shock view
in itselfis very limited and potentially misleading because it neglects the com-
mon core ofbusiness cycles and inclines to a barren episodic treatment ofthe
subject that ignores important lessons ofboth theory and history. Still, major
disturbances can help to allow for the diversity ofcyclical experience.
deny that expectations which drive forward-looking behavior are likely to be rational in the more
limited sense ofattempting to make the best use ofthe information deemed worth collecting.18 Chapter One
With regard to the moderation of business cycles, it is not at all clear that
the last 40 years had fewer major shocks than the periods 1894-1914 and
1919-39. Wars cause strong perturbations, and recent times witnessed the
wars in Korea and Vietnam as well as the high tensions ofthe cold war, all of
which produced a rising but very unsteady flow of defense expenditures. In
1989-90 the cold war was effectively won by the United States and its allies,
and in 1990-91 the conflict and war with Iraq ended in a quick and low-cost
victory, so military spending may be reduced. In contrast, peace prevailed in
the earlier periods, though it was increasingly threatened. When the wartime
cycles are excluded, recent contractions still turn out to be on average shorter
and milder than their historical counterparts, and recent expansions longer, if
not more vigorous.
The great advance in the production of comprehensive economic informa-
tion may have contributed to the reduction in general business fluctuations by
enabling both the policymakers and the public to monitor and react to macro-
economic developments in a much more informed and therefore potentially
more efficient manner. It is only after World War II that quarterly data for
national income and product accounts, monthly data on the money stock, and
monthly data on new investment commitments and other leading indicators,
among others, became publicly and relatively promptly and freely available.
However, this is a neglected factor and little is known about its effects.
Another possible way of dealing with diversity is through disaggregation.
In systems with many goods and markets, information is always incomplete
and partly private as people must be selective and economical about what data
they acquire. The resulting gaps and asymmetries, especially when combined
with temporary price rigidities in many markets, can give rise to recurrent
maladjustments ofrelative prices and quantities. Although varying by sectoral
origin, such imbalances can, if sufficiently large and widespread, contribute
significantly to the instability of total output and employment. They are re-
flected in the cyclical patterns of inventory-sales ratios, price-cost markups,
and profit margins. These imbalances have been noted in early NBER studies
but they appear to be important in the present moderate business cycles and
mild growth cycles as well (for references, see chapters 2 and 5 and Boehm
1990). There is still much to be learned about the sources and dynamics of
these diffusion processes.
In the disaggregate and extended versions ofthe RBC theory, random local
shocks to technology and tastes are propagated across markets. Although
prices are flexible, complex lags may arise because sectoral shifts are not rec-
ognized promptly and correctly, and specialized labor and capital require time
to be reallocated (Black 1982; Lilien 1982). Conceivably the shifts and trans-
fers could be concentrated during recessions because the value ofthe forgone
output is then relatively low, but the idea encounters some serious problems.9
9. In particular, this hypothesis (Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant 1985; S. Davis 1987) is difficult
to reconcile with the observed strong inverse correlation between cyclical movement in the un-19 Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
Diversified market economies appear to be very resilient with respect to
even large and persistent shifts in the composition ofdemand, relative prices,
and technological advances. For example, in 1980-85 important parts ofU.S.
manufacturing suffered strong setbacks from intensive foreign competition
aided by a massive appreciation ofthe dollar. Yet the expansion that began in
1982 endured because of the prevalence of gains elsewhere in the economy.
Most sectoral disturbances are much smaller, more varied, and localized, and
it is reasonable to think of their effects as canceling each other out across
markets within fairly short periods of time. But this argument is not entirely
compelling, and there is certainly much more scope for useful research in
studying disaggregate systems than in dealing with "representative agent"
models.
What generally matters more than industry detail, however, is the coverage
ofthe main variables and specification oftheir interactions in the cyclical pro-
cess. A theory relevant to both the major and minor cycles experienced over
long time periods by the industrialized market economies will probably have
to be eclectic and accommodative in the spirit ofMitchell (see chapter 5, sec.
5.2 below). It will combine tested elements from early and recent business
cycle studies and from ongoing work but avoid excessive generalization and
spurious rigorism.
employment rate and the job vacancy (or help wanted) rate. In contrast, fluctuations in aggregate
demand can readily account for this relationship as well as for the clearly procyclical movements
in the quit rate (Abraham and Katz 1986).